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The Role Of The Employer In Employer-Administered
Group Insurance Plans
Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance Company'
Plaintiff Elfstrom was president and majority stockholder of a
corporation which held a group insurance policy issued by the defend-
ant. He directed an employee, Mrs. Still, who handled the adminis-
tration of the corporation's group insurance program, to enroll his
daughter, Brenda. Mrs. Still filled out Brenda's application and policy
certificate and, in doing so, made a number of misstatements regard-
ing the eligibility of the applicant. Although she was a part-time
employee, Brenda failed to meet the technical requirements for eligi-
bility under the policy.2 After Brenda's death Elfstrom brought suit
for benefits under the policy, claiming that because Mrs. Still was
the insurer's agent and enrolled Brenda with knowledge of her in-
eligibility, the insurer could not assert that ineligibility as a defense.
The insurer, contending that Mrs. Still was not its agent, raised the
defense of ineligibility and filed a cross-complaint asking for rescission
of the policy. The trial court held that Mrs. Still was not the insurer's
agent and permitted the insurer to rescind the insurance certificate
issued to Brenda. The Supreme Court of California, concluding that
the corporation, through Mrs. Still, was acting as an agent of the in-
surer in administering the policy and that errors in administration
were, thus, attributable to the insurer, reversed the decision of the trial
court and held that the insurer could not raise the defense of ineligi-
bility.8 The court went on to hold that the insurer would be entitled
to rescission of the certificate of life insurance issued to Brenda if it
were proved that the plaintiff-beneficiary, Elfstrom, had fraudulently
misrepresented material facts in Brenda's application for insurance and
remanded the case for a finding on this issue."
The issues before the court in Elfstrom are peculiar to employer-
administered group insurance administration, for it is the employer's
role in the effective functioning of this kind of insurance which sets
it apart from all other insurance programs.5 The typical insurance
policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured. As contract-
ing parties, their acts and omissions are covered by a relatively well
defined body of law. Group insurance, on the other hand, substitutes
the employer as the second contracting party in place of the insured.
The policy is issued directly to the employer. Usually the insured
employee never sees the master policy; his knowledge of its terms is
1. 67 Cal. 2d 560, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
2. Brenda was enrolled under Class C coverage. To be eligible for this coverage
the applicant must have worked at least thirty-two hours per week for a period of
six months prior to applying, and must have earned at least two hundred dollars per
month. Brenda attended school and met the eligibility requirements for a period of less
than four months instead of the required six. 432 P.2d at 733, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
3. "We are convinced that the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing
the duties of administering group insurance policies." 432 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 41.
4. 432 P.2d at 739-40, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.5. For an explanation of the normal operation of group insurance plans, see
D. GRzGG, AN ANALysIs oP GROUP LrY INsuRANcE 24-44 (1950).
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limited to that acquired through informal channels or from publica-
tions put out by the insurer or the employer during subscription drives.6
It is this lack of knowledge and the resulting dependence upon the
employer to handle "the details" of the insurance program which
create most of the legal difficulties in group insurance litigation.
In employer-administered group insurance plans, the employer
performs the functions connected with the administration of the policy,
functions which, under normal insurance contracts, are handled by
the insurer. As a result, the legal capacity of the employer in such
insurance plans is highly uncertain. The employer is the real insured
under the policy and, as such, appears to be acting in behalf of the
employees. The employees depend on the employer to handle the
"details" necessary to procure and maintain insurance coverage. At
the same time, the employer performs the administrative functions
normally assumed by the insurer, and, in that respect, seems to be
acting for the insurer. Controversy over the role of the employer has
been generally concerned with his actions in three areas: 1) enroll-
ment of employees and general administration; 2) payment of prem-
iums; and 3) notice of claims. In resolving the litigation in these
areas the courts have almost universally adopted the law of agency.
However, the application of agency principles to determine the legal
status of the employer has not been uniform. The cases are almost
equally split between those which hold the employer to be an agent of
the insurer7 and those which hold him to be an agent of the employees.8
The decision which undoubtedly has had the greatest effect on
judicial thought in this area was handed down by the Supreme Court
in the case of Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.9
The issue facing the Court in that case was not one of employer
administration but was, rather, a conflict of laws problem. The appel-
lant, an employee enrolled in a group insurance plan, argued that
since he had been enrolled under the policy in Texas, the law of that
state should be controlling. He buttressed that position with the theory
that the policyholder, his employer, acted as an agent of the insurer
in administering the policy in Texas. The Court decided against the
6. Occasionally the certificate of insurance issued to the employee as notice that
coverage has begun will contain some information about the specific terms of the policy.
7. See, e.g., Dorman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 889
(S.D. Cal. 1939), aff'd, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1940); Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co. v.
Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527 (1963) ; Cason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91
Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Florence, 47 Ga.
App. 711, 171 S.E. 317 (1933) ; Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d
960 (Okla. 1960) ; Coker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 188 S.C. 472, 199 S.E. 694 (1938).
Cf. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burch, 293 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1961); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Pope, 193 Ark. 139, 97 S.W.2d 915 (1936).
8. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Quilty, 92 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1937);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Messier, 173 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1959); Thigpen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Ga. App. 405, 195 S.E. 591 (1938) ; Kloidt v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 661, 16 A.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Layman v.
Continental Assur. Co., 416 Pa. 155, 205 A.2d 93 (1964); McFadden v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 351 Pa. 570, 41 A.2d 624 (1945) ; Best v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 165 Pa. Super. 452, 68 A.2d 400 (1949) ; Bahas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,
128 Pa. Super. 167, 193 A. 344 (1937). See also Wing v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins.
Co., 314 Mass. 269, 49 N.E.2d 905 (1943) (dictum); Hroblak v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 395, 79 N.E.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1947) (dictum).
9. 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
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employee on the ground that the real contract of insurance was not
the enrollment of the employee in Texas but the master policy issued
to the employer in Pennsylvania. ° However, the Court felt com-
pelled to refute the agency argument:
Employers regard group insurance not only as protection at
low cost for their employees but also as advantageous to them-
selves in that it makes for loyalty, lessens turn-over and the like.
When procuring the policy, obtaining applications of employees,
taking payroll deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured
group, paying premiums and generally in doing whatever may
serve to obtain and keep the insurance in force, employers act not
as agents of the insurer but for their employees or for themselves."
This portion of the Boseman opinion is open to criticism on three
grounds. First, although group insurance may be desirable from the
point of view of both the employer and his employees, the employer's
administration of the program also greatly benefits the insurer:
Much of the work of soliciting individuals for insurance and
practically all of the duties of collecting insurance premiums have
been taken over by the group client's organization. The obvious
result is that there are fewer functions to be performed by the
insurance agent or broker and by the insurance company's salaried
personnel than in the case of individual insurance.12
Second, in concentrating solely on the benefit flowing from the em-
ployer's actions, the Court ignored other widely accepted criteria of
agency relationships, such as control over the agent, consent to the
agency relationship, and public policy. I" Third, the broad, all-encom-
passing language of the Boseman decision glosses over the fact that
widely differing considerations may be applicable to the various facets
of the employer's administration. Regrettably, in later decisions, courts
failed to appreciate the narrow issue actually involved in Boseman and
cited the case for the sweeping proposition that the employer is always
the agent of his employees in administering group insurance. The
result has been a line of authority which lacks both careful analysis
and flexibility.' 4
The real impact of Boseman, however, resulted not from its
analysis or arguments, but from its presentation of the issues. Because
the Boseman Court dealt only with the question of agency, most
courts, whether they accept the Boseman conclusion or not, have re-
duced the range of issues connected with employer administration of
10. 301 U.S. at 203-04. The Court held that the master policy and not the cer-
tificate issued to the employee constituted the contract of insurance. See D. GRxz,
AN ANALYsIs Or GROUP Lrrz INSURANCE 59-60 (1950). For an example of a case
deciding this question solely on the agency issue, see Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson,
297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944).
11. 301 U.S. at 204-05 (emphasis added).
12. D. GRG, AN ANALysIs or GROUP Lrrg INSURANCg 104 (1950).
13. W. SiAviY, HANDBOOK Or Tn LAW or AGENCY § 3 (1964); RXSTA.rZMtNT
(SECOND) or AGtNCY §§ 1, 14 (1958).
14. See cases cited note 8 supra.
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group insurance to the single question of agency. Thus, it was to this
question that the Elfstrom court turned thirty years after the decision
in Boseman. While the Elfstrom court realized that the issue of the
employer's agency could not be determined simply from an analysis
of the benefit flowing from his activities, 5 it seized upon equally
narrow and precarious arguments in finding the employer to be the
agent of the insurer:
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that
the employer acts as the agent of the insurer, however, is that
the employee has no knowledge of or control over the employer's
actions in handling the policy or its administration. An agency
relationship is based upon consent by one person that another
shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. . . . It is
clear ... that the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency
test with regard to the administration of the policy, whereas
that between the employer and its employees fails to reflect
true agency.16
While it is true that the employee has, normally, little or no control
over his employer, the insurer probably has no more effective control
over the employer than does the employee. This is especially true in
the case of group programs which are completely administered by
the employer.' 7  If the insurer's "consent" to the employer's agency
can be found from the simple act of entering into a group insurance
contract, then the employee's consent may equally be implied from his
applying for insurance which he knows will be administered by his
employer.' 8
It would appear that the use of abstract, generalized criteria in
attempting to resolve the agency issue is inconclusive at best, for, in
the final analysis, the employer simply doesn't fit the normal agency
mold. His position and actions are defined by economic expediency,
not by legal theories. The real question, therefore, is one of allocating
a risk which none of the parties anticipated; the answer can be found
not in the application of inappropriate legal formulas but through a
practical analysis of the facts of each case.
One general area of litigation, as noted earlier, involves the role
of the employer in the enrollment of employees under a group program
15. The employer, the employee, and the insurer enjoy distinct advantages from
this form of insurance. The employer, at a comparatively small cost, is enabled
to reduce labor turnover and to enhance the loyalty of its employees and their
families. The employee benefits by obtaining insurance at modest cost, without
the necessity of a physical examination. Group insurance is profitable to the
insurer because it sells policies on a mass basis at negligible per capita sales cost.
432 P.2d at 735, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
16. Id. at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
17. Essentially there are two forms of group insurance administration. The
employer may simply serve as a forwarding agent for the insurance company which
handles most of the clerical work, or, as in Elfstrom, the employer may completely
administer the program, merely sending the insurer a list of the insured employees
and remitting premiums. D. GREGG, AN ANALYSIS oi' GRoup Lig INSURANc" 71 n.17,
115-22 (1950).
18. Elfstrom is representative of a great many cases which have arrived at the
conclusion that the employer is always the agent of the insurer, but which have failed
to support their conclusions with compelling arguments. See cases cited note 7 supra.
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and in the general clerical administration of that program. The
Elfstrom case dealt with a typical problem in this area. The court
there held that since the employer was the agent of the insurer, the
employer's failure to recognize the ineligibility of the employee was
attributable to the insurer and could not be used to bar plaintiff's
recovery on the policy. A similar result was reached in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Dorman'9 on the theory that the
insurer was estopped from asserting the ineligibilty of the employee
because the employer was the agent of the insurer and, in that capacity,
had accepted premiums from the ineligible employee over a consider-
able period of time. However, the approaches taken in Elfstrom and
Hancock apparently overlook the complexities which are involved when
agency principles are applied. The bare assertion that the employer
is the agent of the insurer is insufficient to charge the insurer with full
responsibility for his acts. Even if the employer is declared the agent
of the insurer, another question remains: the determination of the
scope of the employer's authority as agent of the insurer. Since it is
highly unlikely that an insurer would give an employer the express
authority to alter the terms of the master policy by enrolling ineligible
employees, the real issue appears to be the extent of the employer's
apparent authority. In cases where the employee is completely ignorant
of the eligibility requirements of the policy (and this would probably
include the majority of the cases) the apparent authority question is
greatly simplified, since the employee's reliance on the employer is
absolute. Where, as in Elfstrom, the employee is in a position to know
the terms of the policy, the issue becomes the much more difficult one
of the employer's apparent authority to modify the express terms of
the policy. These complex agency problems are, of course, avoided by
those courts which hold the employer to be the agent of the employee
in the enrollment process.20
These same issues are present in cases where, instead of enrolling
ineligible employees, the employer fails to notify an employee that he
has become ineligible for further coverage or keeps the employee on
the company rolls after employment has in fact ceased. As in the
cases dealing with registration, most courts have decided these ques-
tions by merely holding the employer to be an agent of the employee
or the insurer.21
The enrollment problem is clouded by the fact that employees are
usually not adequately informed of the eligibility requirements of the
master policy. Where the employee is left ignorant of the eligibility
standards of the policy, the strict application of the rule that the em-
ployer is the agent of the employee would deny coverage to that em-
ployee, in the event of an enrollment mistake by the employer, without
19. 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1940).
20. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977
(1934). The Hall case was held not to apply to group insurance programs adminis-
tered by one other than an employer. Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall,
291 Ky. 120, 163 S.W.2d 45 (1942).
21. Compare Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. McCrary, 103 Ga. App. 549, 120 S.E.2d 134(1961) and Shanks v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Okla. 1938), with
Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927) and Wyatt v.
Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 178 Kan. 91, 283 P.2d 243 (1955).
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regard to the employee's total lack of responsibility for that mistake.
By the same token, the fast adherence to the theory that the employer
is the agent of the insurer in cases where the employee is made fully
aware of the eligibility requirements and, thus, should be aware of any
mistake made by the employer concerning his eligibility, would impose
an undue hardship on the insurer and bestow an undeserved benefit on
the employee.2" Accordingly, the real issue in the enrollment cases
should be not the dry legal question of whether the employer is the
agent of the insurer or the employee, but the more practical considera-
tion of whether or not the insurer has adequately familiarized the
employees with the eligibility standards of the policy. To the extent
that agency principles are applied on a case by case basis, with the
result hinging on whether or not the insurer has fully acquainted the
employees with the prerequisites for their eligibility, the agency formula
can produce equitable solutions to the enrollment problem. The strict
adherence to one of the two agency theories, however, will necessarily
result in inequities.
The payment of premiums has been the most fertile source of
litigation in group policy administration. In most cases, the issue is
the effect on the status of the employee's coverage of the employer's
failure to remit to the insurer premiums deducted from the employee's
salary. This area of litigation differs from the enrollment cases in
that, with a few exceptions, 23 the express terms of the policy do not
directly deal with the method of payment. In spite of this distinction,
the courts, in resolving this problem, have split along the same lines
as the enrollment cases. Some have held the employer to be an agent
of the insurer and, hence, have concluded that his deductions end the
employee's payment -responsibilities.2 1 Others have decided that the
employer is an agent of his employees and denied relief to the in-
sured employee. 2
5
22. The Elfstrom court partially recognized this problem, holding that the father
could not recover on the policy if he procured the insurance coverage for his daughter
with the knowledge that she was ineligible, and remanding the case for a finding of
fact on this issue. However, the fact that the father in Elfstrom was the employer as
well as the beneficiary under the policy may have been a crucial factor in this holding.
23. See, e.g., Swift & Co. Employees Benefit Ass'n v. Lemire, 145 S.W.2d 698
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
24. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Acker, 93 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1937) ; General
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Gant, 119 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). The same rule
has been applied to social clubs and lodges whose officers administer group policies.
See, e.g., Grossman v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 124 Misc. 520, 208 N.Y.S. 582
(Sup. Ct. 1925); Waites v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 181
S.C. 215, 186 S.E. 276 (1936).
25. Some courts have held that the policy lapsed simply because the employer
was not an agent of the insurer for the purpose of collecting premiums. See, e.g.,
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Yates, 288 Ky. 309, 156 S.W.2d 128 (1941) ; Rivers v.
State Capital Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 461, 96 S.E.2d 431 (1957) ; South Branch Valley
Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 155 S.E.2d 845 (W. Va. 1967). Other courts have taken the
further unnecessary step of holding the employer to be an agent of the employees.
See, e.g., McVay v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
Okla. 1939) ; Boger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963);
Haneline v. Turner White Casket Co., 238 N.C. 127, 76 S.E.2d 372 (1953) ; Hanaieff
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952). When dealing with
non-group policies the courts have had no difficulty in holding that the failure of an
employer to remit premiums lapses the policy. See, e.g., McFarland v. Businessmen's
Assur. Co., 105 Ga. App. 209, 124 S.E.2d 432 (1962) ; Holloman v. Jefferson Standard
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Usually the employee's only contact with the payment process is
the signing of a card authorizing paycheck deductions in an amount
necessary to defray the premiums. Under such circumstances, the em-
ployee has no control over the process of payment and no way of dis-
covering any failure to pay on the part of his employer. A rule holding
him responsible for his employer's failure to pay would put him in
an extremely vulnerable position. If the insurer's failure to acquaint
the employee with his payment responsibilities, together with the total
circumstances of a case, has led the employee to believe that payment
through his employer by means of paycheck deductions terminates his
payment responsibility, then the insurer should not be permitted to
raise non-payment as a defense.2" The same result could be reached
by treating the employer as the agent of the insurer; the paycheck
deductions would then be direct payments to the insurer's agent and
would, thus, terminate the employee's payment obligation.
Another approach to this problem, distinct from the agency theory,
is the possibility of treating the insurer's acceptance of the salary
deduction plan, with its attendant risks, as a substitute for direct pay-
ment. If this theory were adopted, the employee's authorization for
deductions from his salary would, for the purposes of his right to
recover on the policy, constitute absolute payment. An analogous
approach was taken in National Benefit Association v. Jackson,27 in
which an order drawn by an employee on his employer as a part of his
monthly salary was held to be absolute payment of an insurance
premium even though the employer erroneously refused to pay the
insurer. The court in that case reasoned that the insurer's acceptance
of the order constituted a waiver of cash payment and the substitution
in its stead of a right of action against the employer. =" The use of
similar reasoning with respect to the insurer's acceptance of a salary
deduction scheme would guarantee employee coverage and, at the same
time, leave the resolution of any legal difficulties concerning the actual
exchange of cash to the insurer and the employer, the parties most
responsible for the existence of such difficulties. This approach, how-
ever, involves an even greater degree of legal sophistry than the theory
that the employer is the agent of the insurer. The results of the two
theories are, for all practical purposes, identical.
Cases involving the effect of an employee's notification of the
employer, rather than the insurer, of claims under the policy consti-
tute the third major area of litigation with respect to group policy
administration. These cases are similar to those dealing with enroll-
Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 500 (La. App. 1938). But see Leverett v. Continental Cas. Co.,
246 Mich. 172, 225 N.W. 515 (1929).
26. Cf. All States Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 226 Ala. 245, 146 So. 393, 396 (1933)
It is said that, so far as the employer is concerned, this is a paternalistic
form of insurance. Even so, in its modern development group policies have come
to embody quite liberal terms. Insurers have the distinct advantage of dealing,
in course of operations under the policy, with one person; the employer to whom
the policy is issued. The rules of law construing insurance contracts favorably
to the insured, the employee, in this form of insurance, have all the basic reasons
for their application here.
27. 114 Ill. App. 533, 2 N.E. 414 (1885).
28. 2 N.E. at 416.
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ment and eligibility problems in that they are affected by the express
terms of the policy. The basic issue in these cases is whether or not
the employee has complied with the specific notification procedure
outlined in the policy. The employer's role in the process is not deter-
mined by the simple application of an "agent" label, but depends upon
an examination of the scope and source of his agency and his authority
to change or waive portions of the policy itself.29 However, these cases
are different from those previously discussed in that the issue is not
the effect of the employer's failure to perform as the policy requires
or the parties expect, but the insured's failure to follow the express
terms of the policy. Essentially the factual question upon which most
of these cases hinge is whether the insurer has placed the employer in
a position of apparent authority to receive notification of claims. Where
it was shown that some overt act of the insurer led the employee to
reasonably believe that the employer was the proper recipient of
claims, the courts have generally held the insurer liable under the
policy."0 However, in the absence of such obvious grounds for relief,
the courts have uniformly held that lack of notice to the insurer was
fatal to the employee's claim. 1 This latter result seems unjustified.
Lack of notification is a defense based upon provisions in the master
policy issued to the employer. If the insurer has failed to inform the
employee of these provisions and if the employee has otherwise fully
29. Cf. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett, 240 Md. 591, 214 A.2d 754 (1965).
30. In Porter v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 71 S.W.2d 766 (Kan. City, Mo.
Ct. App. 1934), for example, an employer's refusal to entertain an employee's claim
was held binding on the insurer after the insurer had directed the insured to contact
the employer for a determination of his claim. These actions by the employer were
held to be a waiver by the insurer of the requirement to furnish proof of disability.
Similarly, in Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 764 (St. Louis, Mo.
Ct. App. 1939), notice to the employer was held to be notice to the insurer where
the insurer circulated "Statement of Claim" forms which contained instructions direct-
ing the employee to forward claims to the employer who would then send them to
the insurer. If the policy expressly directs the employee to give notice of claims to
his employer, then the employer is clearly the agent of the insurer for that purpose.
Sullivan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 870 (St Louis, Mo. Ct.
App. 1937). See generally Weathers v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 169 S.C. 402, 112
S.E. 44 (1922). Special exceptions may also be made in the case of children:
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that an employer or a union under
a group policy does not act as agent for the insurer....
We do not consider these cases to be equally applicable to this group insur-
ance policy issued to a school district to insure young children (in this case a
six-year-old) .... When small children are led by the insurance company into
dealing exclusively with school authorities, the company must accept the school
authorities as its agents.
Frankel v. Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co., 199 Pa. Super. 295, 184 A.2d 305, 308-09 (1962).
31. Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 166 Kan. 616, 203 P.2d 150 (1949);
Wing v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 269, 49 N.E.2d 905 (1943)
Dewease v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 732, 182 S.E. 447 (1935) ; Tibbs v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 172 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943) (dictum) ; Ralston v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Utah 496, 62 P.2d 1119 (1936). A similar problem
arises in connection with notice of change of beneficiaries. With some exceptions,
the courts have been more liberal in this area. Compare Boehne v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 224 Minn. 57, 28 N.W.2d 54 (1947) and Kaiser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 272
Wis. 527, 76 N.W.2d 311 (1956), with Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F.2d 930 (5th Cir.
1953). But see Eason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 291(1963) in which the court held that an employer was not the agent of the insurer
for the purpose of forwarding an employee's notice that he wished to withdraw from
the program. The Elfstrom court specifically expressed its disapproval of the Eason
case. 432 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
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performed his duties under the policy, all considerations of fairness
militate against permitting the insurer to raise this defense. To do so
would be to hold the employee responsible for knowledge which he
has little opportunity to acquire and would open the way for a variety
of technical policy requirements that could make a mockery of em-
ployee coverage.
Agency principles were used in the three basic areas discussed
herein to determine the insurer's liability under the policy. There are,
additionally, two situations in which the law of agency has been used
to ascertain the insurer's liability to third parties. Occasionally, state
governments have attempted to prosecute insurance companies which
carried group insurance within their boundaries for "doing business"
in the state without proper licensing. It has been argued by the states
that the employer holding the policy and administering a group insur-
ance program is an agent of the insurer and, thus, that the insurer is
subject to the state's licensing laws.8" Without exception, the courts in
such cases have found that the insurer was not subject to the state's
licensing provisions for the simple reason that the employer was not an
agent of the insurer.8" Their preoccupation with the single issue of the
employer's agency is an over-simplification of the problem. It is clear
that the employer could be the agent of the insurer in part of the
administration of a group policy without subjecting the insurer to
prosecution for "doing business" without a license. Conversely, the
insurer might well be found to be "doing business" in the absence of
any agency relationship with the employer if, for example, its field
representative took an overactive part in helping the employer admin-
ister the policy." In short, the courts have apparently confused the
broad question of an insurer's responsibility to others for the actions
of the employer with the more technical question of its existence as
a business entity within state boundaries. Obviously the two will not
always be coextensive.
There have also been a few cases dealing with the question of
whether service of process on an employer administering a group
policy constitutes proper service on the insurer. The court in Blaylock
v. Prudential Insurance Co. relied upon the absence of an agency
relationship between the insurer and the employer in holding that
service on the employer was insufficient to bring the insured within
the court's jurisdiction. The significance of this issue has been greatly
eroded by the proliferation of "long arm" statutes, the provisions of
which do not require personal service within the jurisdiction.8"
The common thread running through almost all of the cases in
this area is a failure to appreciate that the label "agent" carries with
32. For an example of these licensing laws, see MD. ANN. CODi art. 48A, §§
42-61A (1968).
33. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Spear, 185 Ark. 615, 48 S.W.2d
553 (1932); People ex rel. Kirkman v. Van Amringe, 266 N.Y. 277, 194 N.E. 754
(1935).
34. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
35. 84 Ga. App. 641, 67 S.E.2d 173 (1951).
36. E.g., MD. ANN. CODt art. 75, §§ 94-100 (1965). See Auerbach, The "Long
Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. Rev. 13 (1966); Note, Civil Procedure -
Service of Process on the Foreign Corporation, 18 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 145 (1965).
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it no intrinsic determination of the scope of the agency relationship.
It seems clear that the Elfstrom holding is undesirable to the extent
that it assumes the employer to be the agent of the insurer in all
activities connected with the administration of a group policy. The
particular circumstances of a case may well dictate the opposite con-
clusion. For the same reason, the Boseman rationale is misleading
when accepted blindly. It is the assumption, implicit in both decisions,
that there is no middle ground between finding that the employer is
a general agent for either the insurer or the insured which is the
failing of both. As noted in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richards :87
"It may be established that a person is an agent of the insured or the
insurer, or of both parties. . . ." Perhaps the legal difficulties sur-
rounding employer-administered group policies stem from the fact that
agency principles are entirely inappropriate in that area. It can be per-
suasively argued that the employer acts for himself only and is the
agent of neither the insurer nor the insured. In Langley v. Prudential
Insurance Co.,38 the court answered an argument that the employer
was an agent of the insurer with the observation: "The Pullman Com-
pany [the employer] was a party to the insurance contract entered
into between it and the defendant [the insurer]. It was a party to
the contract adverse to the defendant. The contract was not a con-
tract of agency. It was a contract of insurance." 9  While perhaps
couched in oversimplified language, this statement does suggest that
the application of agency concepts in this area of litigation is artificial.
What is really at issue is not agency, but the illusion of agency, not
a relationship based upon general theorems of the law, but one which
has as its foundation the particular facts in each case. Perhaps the
most equitable solution in these cases would be to ignore the role of
the employer, for purposes of the litigation, and resolve the conflict
by balancing the relative rights and equities of the insurer and the
employee. Such an approach would avoid the agency dilemma alto-
gether and, at the same time, would allow the courts more flexibility
in dealing with group insurance problems.
While statutory guidelines would be extremely helpful,4 ° much
of the litigation over group insurance administration could be avoided
37. 229 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1956). See Greer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,
180 S.C. 162, 185 S.E. 68 (1936). Although there have been no Maryland cases
determining the employer's position in a group insurance program, two Maryland
cases dealing with individual insurance policies suggest that the court of appeals
might take a position between Elfstrom and Boseman. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
v. Mallick, 160 Md. 71, 153 A. 35 (1931), the court found that an insurance agent
acted for the insurer in collecting premiums and remitting them, but was the agent of
the insured in soliciting the insurance. And in District Agency Co. v. Suburban
Delivery Service, 224 Md. 364, 370, 167 A.2d 874, 877 (1961), the court stated:
"Essentially, we think that District Agency acted as broker for Suburban in obtaining
the insurance . . . but that it acted as agent for the insurance company both in
countersigning the policy and with regard to the collection of premiums."
38. 161 S.W.2d 27 (St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
39. Id. at 30-31.
40. Statutory provisions relating to the employers' administration of group in-
surance programs have been limited to measures excluding employers from the licens-
ing regulations covering insurance agents. E.g., MD. ANN. CODP art. 48A, § 166
(1968). But cf. Voris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Okla. 1939). The
court decided in Elfstrom that the California Insurance Code was not useful in reaching
its conclusions, 432 P.2d at 738 n.9, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 42 n.9.
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if insurance companies would insert provisions in their policies ex-
pressly delineating the responsibilities of each party and, at the same
time, sponsor more complete programs of employee education dealing
with their policies. It should be kept in mind, however, that the courts
will be reluctant to allow insurance companies to shift too much of
the risk of employer negligence onto the insured employees, who are
least able to bear the losses resulting from poor administration of
the group policy.
Group insurance is a comparatively new form of insurance,
and each problem presented . . . concerning it should be ap-
proached with the purpose of giving to it every legitimate oppor-
tunity of becoming a social agency of real consequence .... These
results would be defeated if the employer, by poor administra-
tion could be instrumental in causing the insurance to become
unavailable to the employee. 4
Hopefully the courts will begin to abandon the rigidity in approach
which has characterized too many of the cases in this area and move
toward a consideration of the group insurance problem that is more
responsive to contemporary social pressures.42
41. Neider v. Continental Assur. Co., 213 La. App. 621, 35 So. 2d 237, 240
(1948). See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
42. According to the 1967 LrPE INSURANCg FAC'r BooK, published by the Institute
of Life Insurance at the end of 1966, group life insurance accounted for thirty-five
per cent of all life insurance in force, or some 343.4 billion dollars' worth. Even more
suggestive of the social implications of this form of insurance is the fact that group
insurance programs covering small groups are rapidly increasing. In 1956 group
insurance policies covering twenty-five or fewer employees accounted for 24.5% of
total group life coverage; in 1963 this figure had risen to 54.1%. For a good dis-
cussion of the social consequences of expanding group insurance coverage see S.
KIMBgLL, INSURANC & PUBLIC POLICY 307 (1960).
